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Abstract: 
This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy 
transmission in a medium-scale New Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic 
complementarities in price-setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate 
channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation. Although the strength 
of this effect increases with economic openness, it also requires that import prices respond to 
exchange rate changes. In this case domestic producers find it optimal to adjust their prices to 
exchange rate changes which alter the domestic currency price of their foreign competitors. 
We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a 
vector autoregression on U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries. 
While we find evidence for strong complementarities, exchange rate pass-through is limited. 
Openness has therefore little bearing on monetary transmission in the estimated model. 
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Recent research on the monetary transmission mechanism has focused on the quantitative perfor-
mance of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Speciﬁcally, interest has centered
on their ability to account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks as apparent from esti-
mated vector autoregression (VAR) models. In a seminal study, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) show that a medium scale New Keynesian model mimics quite closely the VAR-responses to
a monetary policy shock of as many as nine variables. This result is obtained while abstracting from
external trade altogether. Taken at face value, it suggests that trade integration, or openness, plays no
important role for monetary policy transmission—at least as far as a large open economy such as the
U.S. is concerned.1
There is, however, a secular trend in trade integration, suggesting that economies are becoming con-
siderably more open over time. In the U.S., imports, as a fraction of GDP, have risen from about 6
percent in 1973 to 16 percent to date. In fact, as this trend has been accelerating over the last decade,
some observers have identiﬁed increasing trade integration as an important manifestation of global-
ization.2 In this paper, we investigate more systematically the role of trade integration for monetary
policy transmission, where we measure trade integration by the import-to-GDP ratio. Speciﬁcally,
we assess how increasing openness alters quantitatively the effects of monetary policy shocks on do-
mestic (i.e. producer price) inﬂation and domestic absorption. We focus on these variables, because
they are well deﬁned in closed economy models as well.
Taking an analytical perspective, earlier work by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2001) and Galí and
Monacelli (2005) has stressed the similarity between open and closed economy versions of the New
Keynesian baseline model. In fact, apart from being a source of additional shocks, ‘openness’merely
alters some of the reduced-form coefﬁcients of the canonical representation of the model which is,
in fact, shown to be isomorphic in closed and open economies. More recently, Erceg, Gust, and
López-Salido (2007) have shown that the difference between closed and open economies in this class
of models hinges on the relative size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the trade price
elasticity. Moreover, these authors argue that—for reasonable calibrations—increasing openness is
unlikely to alter the transmission of domestic shocks, monetary policy shocks inclusive, in a quanti-
tatively important way.
1Other studies which employ this approach ﬁnd similarly satisfactory results for variants of the New Keynesian model.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach (2003), Bovin and Giannoni (2006) and Meier and Müller (2006)
are examples. These studies also assume counterfactually closed economy models. Clearly, other studies have explored the
empirical performance of open economy DSGE models; yet these studies have typically not been particularly concerned
with monetary transmission, see, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2007).
2The consequences of globalization for monetary policy are widely discussed both in academia and among policy mak-
ers. Most commentators, taking a fairly general perspective, have argued that globalization does not fundamentally affect
the central bank’s ability to control the economy, see, e.g., Mishkin (2007) and Bernanke (2007). Changes brought about
by globalization may nevertheless require, as Yellen (2006) puts it, “some recalibration of policy responses”.
2However, taking up the question within the New Keynesian baseline model twists the analysis to-
wards ﬁnding no effect of openness. A key assumption underlying the derivation of the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve and, hence, its isomorphism in closed and open economies, is that the demand
functions faced by intermediate goods ﬁrms are characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution.
This, in turn, implies that the desired markup is independent of the price of competitors, i.e. there
are no strategic complementarities in price setting. Such complementarities arise under a more gen-
eral formulation of the demand functions, or, rather, the underlying aggregation technology. In this
case, the isomorphism of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in closed and open economies breaks
down. Intuitively, strategic complementarities arise not only with respect to domestic, but also with
respect to foreign competitors. Hence, the domestic currency price charged by foreign competitors
enters the decision problem of domestic ﬁrms and eventually the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Re-
cently, Guerrieri, Gust, and López-Salido (2008) have highlighted the importance of this mechanism
in accounting for inﬂation dynamics.3
In this paper, we take price-setting complementarities into account when exploring the role of open-
ness for monetary transmission. As a result, a new dimension of the exchange rate channel emerges.
Traditionally, monetary policy is thought to directly impact CPI-inﬂation and to indirectly impact
domestic inﬂation via the exchange rate, where the latter effect comes about through changes in de-
mand induced by ‘expenditure-switching’. With strategic price-setting complementarities, changesin
the exchange rate, which alter the domestic currency prices charged by foreign competitors, directly
impact domestic inﬂation. The importance of this effect increases with i) the extent of strategic com-
plementarities in price-setting; ii) the openness of an economy and iii) the amount of exchange rate
pass-through.
Our analysis is based on a medium-scale two-country DSGE model. It features an aggregation tech-
nology for the production of ﬁnal goods which gives rise to strategic complementarities in price-
setting; in addition, the aggregationtechnologydetermines trade integration by giving unequalweight
to domestically producedand imported intermediate goods. The modelalso features a numberof fric-
tions which the literature has found to increase the empirical success of this class of models; notably,
we allowexchangerate pass-throughto belimited in the short-run. Overall, themodelstructure is rich
enough to provide a quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission mechanism such as
to allow us to study the quantitative implications of trade integration on monetary transmission.
As a benchmark, we compute impulse responses to a monetary policy shock within a VAR model
estimated on quarterly time series data for the U.S. relative to an aggregateof industrialized countries.
In addition to standard ‘closed-economy’ variables, the VAR model also includes CPI-inﬂation as
well as U.S. net exports. We treat the impulse responses as a characterization of the actual monetary
3Speciﬁcally, they estimate the resulting variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve on the basis of single equation
techniques. Importantly, in contrast to our analysis, they assume that all ﬁrms engage in local currency pricing.
3transmission mechanism and estimate the structural parameters of the DSGE model employing the
minimum distance estimation strategy suggested by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano
et al. (2005). To avoid identiﬁcation problems we ﬁx several parameter values prior to the estimation,
most notably the degree of opennesswhich we assume to be 12 percent, i.e. the average import-GDP-
ratio of the U.S. in our sample. We estimate the values of nine parameters and ﬁnd that the estimated
modelisabletoreplicatetheVARevidencefairly wellforplausibleparametervalues. Threeestimates
are particularly noteworthy: a low value for the trade price elasticity, strong complementarities in
price-setting and limited exchange rate pass-through.
In order to explore the role of openness, we compute the effects of a monetary policy shock in an
economy that is approximately closed and an economy where imports account for 40 percent of
GDP. Relative to the baseline economy, there is hardly any difference in the responses of domestic
inﬂation and absorption in these counterfactual economies. Two reasons are key for this result. First,
the estimated value for the trade price elasticity is close to intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
which, according to the results reported by Erceg et al. (2007), prevents openness from altering the
dynamics of the New Keynesian baseline model. Second, as exchange rate pass-through is limited,
the exchange rate channel is prevented from operating in a quantitatively important way. We ﬁnd,
however, that strategic complementarities in price-setting would, in principle, constitute an important
channel through which openness impacts monetary transmission. Speciﬁcally, if we increase the
exchangerate pass-throughfrom anestimated valueof12 percentto 40percent,opennesshassizeable
effects. In this case, moving from the closed to the very open economy increases the effects of a
monetary policy shock on domestic inﬂation by some 25 percent. As an implication for monetary
policy, we stress that the joint evolution of trade integration as well as exchange rate pass-through
should be monitored closely.
The remainder of this paperis organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the details of the model
economy. Section 3 presents time series evidence from the estimated VAR model and discusses the
estimation of the DSGE model. In section 4, we take a closer look at the role of trade integration for
monetary transmission. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we develop a two-country DSGE model to study monetary policy transmission in open
economies. Most of the model features are standard and familiar from so-called medium scale DSGE
models as put forward, for instance, in Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2005) in a
closed economy context.4 There is a representative household in each country owning the capital
4In setting up the model we also draw on earlier work by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), Kollmann (2002), Galí
and Monacelli (2005) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), among others.
4stock which is rented together with labor services to intermediate goods producers on a period-by-
period basis. Adjusting the level of investment is costly. International ﬁnancial markets are assumed
to be complete.
We assume that in each country there is a continuum of intermediate good producers operating under
monopolistic competition and being constrained in price setting à la Calvo. A fraction of these ﬁrms
invoices exports in their own currency. Using common terminology, these ﬁrms are engaging in
‘producer currency pricing’, or ‘PCP’ for short. The remaining ﬁrms are engaging in ‘local currency
pricing’, or ‘LCP’, by invoicing domestic sales and exports in the currency of domestic and foreign
buyers, respectively. A key aspect of monetary transmission in open economies is the extent of
exchange rate pass-through. In our setup it will be smaller, the more pervasive LCP for any given
degree of price rigidity.5
In each country ﬁnal goods ﬁrms combine domestic and imported intermediate goods to provide
households with ﬁnal goods used for consumption and investment purposes. The aggregation tech-
nology employed by ﬁnal goods ﬁrms may imply unequalweights of domestic and imported interme-
diates in the production of ﬁnal goods—thereby determining the degree of openness. In addition, the
aggregation technology induces demand functions for intermediate goods which are characterized by
a non-constant price elasticity of substitution (NCES). Such an aggregation technology has recently
been advocated by Gust et al. (2006), and Guerrieri et al. (2008) in an open economy context. Impor-
tantly, it induces strategic complementarities in price-setting among intermediate good ﬁrms not only
with respect to domestic, but also with respect to foreign competitors.6
In the following we give a formal exposition of the model, discussing in turn the problems of ﬁnal
goods ﬁrms, intermediate good ﬁrms, and the representative household. We close the model with a
feedback rule to characterize monetary policy. As both countries are symmetric, of equal size, and
have isomorphic structures, we focus on the domestic economy, i.e. on the ‘home’ country. When
necessary we refer to foreign variables by means of a star superscript.
2.1 Final goods ﬁrms
Final goods are composites of intermediate goods produced by a continuum of monopolistic com-
petitive ﬁrms in both countries. We use j ∈ [0,1] to index intermediate good ﬁrms as well as their
products and prices. Final goods ﬁrms operate under perfect competition and purchase domestically
5See Bergin (2006) for a similar formulation, Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) for early contributions and Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000) for a critical discussion. Note that in the present model nominal rigidities are critical for limiting the extent
of exchange rate pass-through. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson (2006), in contrast, provide real
models of limited exchange rate pass-through.
6The original closed economy formulation goes back to Dotsey and King (2005) or, more generally, to Kimball (1995).
Sbordone (2007) uses a similar technology when discussing the consequences of ﬁrm entry for the slope of the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve. While Gust et al. (2006) and Guerrieri et al. (2008) focus on pass-through and inﬂation dynamics,
respectively, we explore the implications for monetary transmission.
5produced intermediate goods, At(j), as well as imported intermediate goods, Bt(j). Final goods,
Ft are not traded across countries, but are used for domestic consumption, Ct, investment, It, and
government spending, Gt. In each period, market clearing requires that Ft = Ct + Xt + Gt.
Letting PA
t (j) denote the domestic price of a domestically produced intermediate good and PB
t (j)
the domestic price of an imported intermediate good, the problem of the representative ﬁnal goods
ﬁrm is to produce Ft while minimizing expenditures given by
  1
0
PA
t (j)At(j)dj +
  1
0
PB
t (j)Bt(j)dj (1)
subject to
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where VDt and VMt are deﬁned as follows
VDt =
  1
0
ω
σ
σ−1 1
(1 + η)υ
 
(1 + η)
ω
At(j)
Ft
− η
 υ
dj, (3)
VMt =
  1
0
(1 − ω)
σ
σ−1 1
(1 + η)υ
 
(1 + η)
(1 − ω)
Bt(j)
Ft
− η
 υ
dj. (4)
Ouraggregationtechnologygivenby(2), (3) and(4)follows Gustetal. (2006)closely. Afewremarks
concerning key parameters are in order. The trade price elasticity, i.e. the elasticity which measures
the extent of substitution from goods produced at home to those produced abroad for a given change
in relative prices, is a key parameter for the international transmission mechanism. In our setup it is a
function of several parameters and given by
˜ σ =
−σ
(σ(υ − 1) − υ)(1 + η)
. (5)
The elasticity of substitution between goods produced within the same country is generally time
varying. In steady state it is constant and given by
ǫ =
1
1 − υ
1
1 + η
. (6)
The parameter η plays a crucial role for both elasticities. It provides a measure of how strongly our
setup deviates from the special case where the elasticity of substitution is constant (CES), which is
nestedin ourmodelforη = 0. Finally, the parameterω measurestheweightofdomesticallyproduced
goods in ﬁnal goods in steady state. 1 − ω measures the fraction of imports in ﬁnal goods in steady
state and thus corresponds to the import-GDP-ratio.
Optimization behavior of domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods ﬁrms gives rise to demand functions for
domestically produced intermediate goods
At(j) =
ω
1 + η
  
PA
t (j)
PA
t
  1
υ−1  
PA
t
Γt
  σ
σ(υ−1)−υ
+ η
 
Ft, (7)
A∗
t(j) =
1 − ω
1 + η
  
PA∗
t (j)
PA∗
t
  1
υ−1  
PA∗
t
Γ∗
t
  σ
σ(υ−1)−υ
+ η
 
F∗
t , (8)
6where Γt is a price index deﬁned below. Global demand for a generic good j is then given by
Yt(j) = At(j) + A∗
t(j). (9)
Note that the demand function includes a linear term if η  = 0. As a result, price elasticities of de-
mand and the desired markup of intermediate goods ﬁrms will be time-varying, or, in other words,
price-setting behavior at the level of intermediate goods ﬁrms is characterized by strategic comple-
mentarities.
The optimization problem of ﬁnal goods ﬁrm implicitly deﬁnes price indices. For further reference,
it is useful to explicitly distinguish between the prices charged by LCP and PCP-ﬁrms. Therefore, let
P
A,PCP
t (j) and P
A,LCP
t (j) denote the domestic price charged by a domestic intermediate goods ﬁrm
engaged in PCP and LCP, respectively. Letting α ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms and (1 − α)
the fraction of PCP-ﬁrms, the domestic producer price index PA
t and the import prices index PB
t are
given by the following expressions:
PA
t =
   α
0
P
A,LCP
t (j)
υ
υ−1dj +
  1
α
P
A,PCP
t (j)
υ
υ−1dj
  υ−1
υ
, (10)
PB
t =
   α
0
P
B,LCP
t (j)
υ
υ−1dj +
  1
α
P
B,PCP
t (j)
υ
υ−1dj
  υ−1
υ
. (11)
The price index for ﬁnal goods is given by
Pt =
1
1 + η
Γt +
η
1 + η
ω
   α
0
P
A,LCP
t (j)dj +
  1
α
P
A,PCP
t (j)dj
 
(12)
+
η
1 + η
(1 − ω)
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0
P
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t (j)dj +
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,
where
Γt =
 
ω(PA
t )
(σ−1)υ
σ(υ−1)−υ + (1 − ω)(PB
t )
(σ−1)υ
σ(υ−1)−υ
  σ(υ−1)−υ
(σ−1)υ
. (13)
Finally, letting St denote the nominal exchange rate and assuming that the law of one price holds for
PCP-ﬁrms, we obtain the following relationships:
P
B,PCP
t (j) = StP
B,PCP∗
t (j); P
A,PCP
t (j) = StP
A,PCP∗
t (j). (14)
2.2 Intermediate good ﬁrms
The production of intermediate goods, Yt(j), is governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt(j) = Kt(j)θHt(j)1−θ, (15)
where Ht(j) and Kt(j) denote labor and capital employed by ﬁrm j. Letting Wt and Rt denote the
nominal wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively, minimizing costs implies for (nominal)
7marginal costs
MCt(j) =
WtHt(j)
(1 − θ)Yt(j)
=
RtKt(j)
θYt(j)
. (16)
We assume that price setting is constrained exogenously by a discrete time version of the mechanism
suggested by Calvo (1983). Each ﬁrm has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability
1 − ξ. Moreover, we assume that when a ﬁrm has the opportunity to do so, it sets the new price
in order to maximize the expected discounted value of net proﬁts before the realization of shocks in
a given period.7 Firms that do not reoptimize in a certain period index their price to last period’s
producer price inﬂation, where the degree of indexation is given by the parameter κ ∈ [0,1].
In setting the new price P
A,PCP
t (j), the problem of a generic PCP-ﬁrm is given by
max
∞  
k=0
ξkEt−1
 
Qt,t+kYt+k(j)
Pt+k
 
P
A,PCP
t (j)
k  
s=1
 
ΠA
t+s−1
 κ
− MCt+k
  
, (17)
subjectto the demandfunction (9), the productionfunction (15) andthe optimality condition on factor
inputs (16).8 ΠA
t = PA
t /PA
t−1 denotes domestic inﬂation. Proﬁts are discounted with the stochastic
discount factor, Qt,t+1, implicitly deﬁned below.
The pricing problemof a generic LCP-ﬁrm is subjectto the sameconstraints as those of the PCP-ﬁrm.
It sets two distinct prices for the domestic and foreign market. The domestic price P
A,LCP
t (j) is set
to solve
max
∞  
k=0
ξkEt−1
Qt,t+kAt+k(j)
Pt+k
 
P
A,LCP
t (j)
k  
s=1
 
ΠA
t+s−1
 κ
− MCt+k
 
, (18)
subject to the demand function (7), while P
A,LCP∗
t (j) is set to solve
max
∞  
k=0
ξkEt−1
Qt,t+kA∗
t+k(j)
Pt+k
 
St+kP
A,LCP∗
t (j)
k  
s=1
 
ΠB
t+s−1
 κ
− MCt+k
 
(19)
subject to the demand function (8).
2.3 Households
A representative household allocates consumption expenditures intertemporally on ﬁnal goods and
supplies labor, Ht, to intermediate good ﬁrms. The preferences of the household are given by
∞  
t=0
βt[(Ct − bCt−1) (1 − Ht)1− ]1−γ
1 − γ
, (20)
where β is a time discount factor and b ∈ [0,1) measures the extent of consumption habits. The
parameters γ and   are positive constants characterizing preferences.
7In other words, period t prices are set conditional on the information period t − 1, see Christiano et al. (2005).
8In our formulation we implicitly assume that demand for intermediate good j is met at all times.
8Households own the domestic capital stock, Kt, which is internationally immobile as are labor ser-
vices. As in Christiano et al. (2005) it may be costly to adjust the level of investment, It. Speciﬁcally,
the law of motion for capital is given by
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + [1 − Ψ(It/It−1)]It, (21)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate; restricting Ψ(1) = Ψ′(1) = 0 and Ψ′′(1) = χ > 0 ensures that
the steady state capital stock is independent of investment adjustment costs captured by χ.
A complete set of state-contingent securities is traded at an international level. Letting Ξt+1 denote
the period t+1payoffof the portfolio held at the end of period t, the grossshort-term nominalinterest
rate, (1 + it), is implicitly deﬁned by (1 + it)−1 = EtQt,t+1, while the budget constraint reads as
follow
WtHt + RtKt + Υt + Tt − Pt (Ct + Xt) = Et {Qt,t+1Ξt+1} − Ξt. (22)
Υt denotesnominalproﬁts earnedby monopolistic ﬁrms and transferred to householdsand Tt denotes
lump-sum taxes. We assume that government spending is ﬁnanced entirely through lump-sum taxes:
Tt = PtGt.
We assumethatthe householddecideson consumptionand investmentexpendituresin period t before
period-t uncertainty is revealed. Subject to this additional constraint as well as to (21) and (22), the
household maximizes the expected value of (20).
2.4 Monetary Policy
To close the model, we assume that monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule
as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000). Speciﬁcally, we assume for the interest rate
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)
 
i + β−1φπ
 
ΠA
t − ΠA 
+ (4Fβ)−1φy (Ft − F)
 
+ νt, (23)
where letters without time subscript refer to steady state values. The parameter ρ ∈ [0,1] captures
interest rate smoothing, φπ captures the long-run adjustment of the interest rate to producer price in-
ﬂation and φy capturesstabilization of domesticabsorption.9 Finally, νt representsa zero-meanshock
to the short-term interest rate not accounted for by the systematic feedback rule. It thus represents a
monetary policy shock.
9We assume that monetary policy responds to domestic inﬂation and absorption, because under this assumption we can
identify monetary policy shocks in our VAR model in a way which is consistent with our theoretical model. Note also that
in open economy models focusing on domestic inﬂation rather than CPI-inﬂation is often preferable from a welfare point
of view, see Galí and Monacelli (2005). In addition, our formulation of the interest rate rule (23) is meant to facilitate
a comparison of the parameter values φπ and φy to those obtained in the empirical literature on interest rate rules where
inﬂation and interest rate are typically annualized.
92.5 Model solution
We solve the model numerically by applying standard techniques. Speciﬁcally, we use (23) together
with the linearized ﬁrst order conditions and constraints of the ﬁrms’ and household problem as
well as their foreign counterparts to determine the equilibrium allocation near the deterministic and
symmetric steady state. We use the approximate solution of the model to investigate the effects
of monetary policy shocks on the economy. To simplify the analysis, we focus on country differ-
ences, i.e. the behavior of a domestic variable relative to its foreign counterpart. Before discussing
our strategy to assign parameter values, we brieﬂy turn to the implications of strategic price-setting
complementarities for the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission.
2.6 The exchange rate channel revisited
Strategic complementarities in price-setting may alter monetary policy transmission in open
economies by adding a new dimension to the exchange rate channel. Traditionally, two dimensions
of the exchange rate channel have been distinguished (see, for instance, Svensson, 2000). First, un-
der sticky prices, nominal exchange rate changes translate into real exchange rate changes that in
turn induce an expenditure switching effect. As a result, exchange rate changes alter the demand for
domestic goods and thus affect domestic producerprices. Note that in this case, the exchangerate im-
pacts only indirectly—via demand—on domestic inﬂation. Second, nominal exchange rate changes
feed directly into the prices of imported goods and hence into CPI-inﬂation. Both effects, however
depend on the extent of exchangerate pass-through. If import prices are insulated from exchangerate
movements, the exchange rate channel is failing to operate along both dimensions.
Strategic price-setting complementarities add a new dimension to the exchangerate channel. In order
to show this formally, we focus on the case where exchange rate pass-through is complete (α = 0)
and derive a variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve as an approximation of the intermediate
goods ﬁrms’ price setting problem around a deterministic, zero inﬂation steady state:
Et−1πt = βEt−1πt+1 + λ(1 − Ψ)Et−1mct + λΨ(1 − ω)
2ω˜ σ
ǫ
Et−1qt, (24)
where πt denotes percentage points of domestic inﬂation, mct measures the percentage deviation of
marginal costs from steady state and qt denotes percentage deviation of the relative price of imports
expressed in domestic currency. The coefﬁcient λ = (1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)ξ−1 is familiar from the New
Keynesian baseline model and provides a measure for the pass-through of marginal costs onto inﬂa-
tion. The coefﬁcientΨ dependson the extentof strategic complementarities in price-setting and other
structural parameters of the model: Ψ = −1ηǫ(ǫ(1 − η) − 1)−1.10
10Expression (24) abstracts from indexation. In appendix A we derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve considering the
general case α ∈ [0,1]. Guerrieri et al. (2008) provide a derivation under the assumption that α = 1.
10The relationship (24) governs the dynamics of domestic inﬂation. Note that if η = 0, we have Ψ = 0
and the term qt disappears from the Phillips curve. In fact, in this case the Phillips curve takes the
form which is well-known from the closed-economy New Keynesian baseline model. Clarida et al.
(2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) have stressedthis isomorphism, i.e. the fact that the form of the
Phillips curve for the open economy corresponds to that of the closed economy. This case is nested
in our model.
Turning to the case where such complementarities are present (η < 0 → Ψ > 0), we observe that
the relative price of imports directly matters for domestic inﬂation. Consider, for instance, a decrease
in the domestic currency price of imports resulting from an exchange rate appreciation. In this case,
given strategic price-setting complementarities, domestic producers will ﬁnd it optimal to lower their
prices, because the price charged by foreign competitors is reduced: domestic inﬂation falls. In
addition to the coefﬁcient Ψ, two more parameters govern the strength of this effect. First, the larger
the trade price elasticity relative to the elasticity of substitution across domestically produced goods
(˜ σ/ǫ), the stronger the impact of import prices on domestic inﬂation. Second, the impact will also be
stronger, the more open an economy. This follows from imports making up for a larger fraction of
the ﬁnal goods basket, measured by 1 − ω.
As a consequence, monetary policy may directly impact domestic inﬂation via the exchange rate. A
monetary contraction which appreciates the nominal exchange rate and lowers the price of imports
reduces domestic inﬂation. This adds a new dimension to the exchange rate channel, which is not
present in models without price-setting complementarities. Its importance, however, depends on the
extent of exchange rate pass-through in addition to the parameters discussed above. If import prices
are unresponsive to exchange rate changes, the exchange rate channel fails to operate. In order to
gauge its importance, we need to quantify the extent of exchange rate pass-through along with other
key parameters of the model.
3 Estimation
Our model is agnostic as regards the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations and only allows for mon-
etary policy shocks. Accordingly, by bringing the model to the data, we isolate ﬂuctuations in actual
time series which can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. Speciﬁcally,we focus on the empirical
impulse response functions obtained from a VAR estimated on U.S. time series relative to an aggre-
gate of industrialized countries. We use these statistics to pin down the values of key parameters of
the model. Such a limited information approach enables our DSGE model to provide an empirically
plausible account of the monetary transmission mechanism.11
11A natural alternative is to estimate the model using full information techniques. This would require to take a stand of
all possible sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations, which we can avoid for the purpose of the present study.
113.1 Empirical impulse response functions
We estimate the VAR on quarterly time series data for the period 1973–2006. We focus on relative
variables, i.e. the difference of a variable in the U.S. and its counterpart for an aggregate of industri-
alized countries, which is meant to proxy for the rest of the world (‘ROW’ for short), see also Clarida
and Gali (1994) and Rogers (1999). Speciﬁcally, we consider the log of relative consumption, the log
of relative investment, the difference in domestic inﬂation rates (computed on the basis of the GDP
deﬂator), the difference in short term interest rates, the difference in CPI-inﬂation rates as well as real
net exports for the U.S., where real net exports are deﬁned as the log difference in deﬂated exports
and imports.12 Letting Yt denote the vector of endogenous variables, we estimate the structural VAR
model
A(L)Yt = εt, (25)
where A(L) =
 4
i=0 AiLi,LYt = Yt−1 and E(εtε′
t) = I.
In order to identify (relative) monetary policy shocks, we assume that A0 is lower triangular, i.e.
we impose the recursive identiﬁcation scheme which is frequently employed to study the effects
of monetary policy shocks, see Kim (2001) for an open economy context. We attach a structural
interpretation only to the innovation in relative short-term interest rates. Hence, what matters for
identiﬁcation is how the other variables in Yt are ordered relative to this variable, see Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). We order relative consumption, relative investment as well as the
differential of domestic inﬂation before and the differential of CPI-inﬂation and net exports after
the short-term interest rate differential. The implied identiﬁcation assumptions are consistent with
our DSGE model: consumption, investment and domestic inﬂation are predetermined relative to
monetary policy shocks,while consumer(i.e. ﬁnal goods)prices and real net exports are free to adjust
immediately. As in the theoretical model, we are allowing monetary policy to adjust the interest rate
contemporaneously to changes in domestic inﬂation and domestic absorption.13
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, i.e. an increase by 100 basis
points in the U.S. short rate relative to the aggregate of industrialized countries. The solid line shows
the point estimate, while the shaded area measures 90 percent conﬁdence bounds obtained from
bootstrap sampling. The upper row shows the responses of consumption and investment in relative
12We treat CPI-inﬂation as the empirical counterpart of the DSGE model’s inﬂation rate for ﬁnal goods. A detailed
description of the data is given in appendix B. We remove a constant linear trend from consumption and investment before
computing relative variables.
13Alternative approaches to identify monetary policy shocks in open economy frameworks consider on monetary ag-
gregates and non-recursive identiﬁcation schemes, see Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim
and Roubini (2000). More recently, Faust and Rogers (2003) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008) use sign restrictions to achieve
identiﬁcation. These studies have typically been concerned with the behavior of the exchange rate in the face of monetary
policy shocks and on the importance of the latter to account for ﬂuctuations in the former. In the present paper, we are not
taking up these issues. Instead, we use the VAR responses as a key statistic to pin down parameter values of our DSGE
model.
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Figure 1: Effects of a monetary policy shock. Notes: Shock and responses are in relative terms (U.S. vs. ROW),
except for net exports which is the log difference of U.S. exports and imports. Solid line: point estimate; shaded areas:
bootstrapped 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; dashed-dotted line: responses of estimated DSGE model; Vertical axes:
percent, except for inﬂation and interest rate (percentage points). Horizontal axes: quarters.
13terms; for both we ﬁnd a protracted and hump-shaped decline. While consumption falls by roughly
0.3 percent, investment falls by about 1.25 percent, with the maximum effect occurring between three
and six quarters after the shock.
Domestic inﬂation responds somewhat sluggishly; the maximum decline of about 8 basis points is
observedﬁvequarters afterthe shock. Accordingto ourpointestimate,it takesanother3 to 4 yearsfor
inﬂation to return to its pre-shock level. The shock to the interest rate differential is mildly persistent,
with the short rate returning to its pre-shock level after about one year. The response of CPI-inﬂation
is remarkably close to that of domestic inﬂation, both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of
view. Finally, U.S. net exports display a hump-shaped increase with the maximum effect of about 0.2
percent occurring after about a year.
3.2 Estimation of general equilibrium model
The second step of the analysis consists in matching empirical and theoretical impulse responses in
order to obtain estimates for the parameters of the DSGE model. This approach has gained popu-
larity in closed economy studies of monetary policy transmission following the pioneering work of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano et al. (2005).
To illustrate this approach, deﬁne IRe to be the empirical impulse response function characterizing
the data. The model itself assigns to each admissible vector of structural parameters θ a theoretical
impulse responsefunction IR = IR(θ). We obtain an estimate for the parametervectorof interest,   θ,
by minimizing the weighted distance between empirical and theoretical impulse response functions,
i.e., IRe and IR:
  θ = argmin(IRe − IR(θ))
′ W (IRe − IR(θ)), (26)
where W representsa diagonalmatrix whosediagonalentries are the reciprocalvaluesof the variance
of the empirical impulse responses. Using this weighting matrix ensures that the theoretical impulse
responses are made to be as close to the empirical ones as possible, in terms of point-wise standard
deviations. Regarding the length of the impulse response functions, we consider 20 quarters starting
from the second quarter as most variables return to their steady state within 5 years.
The relationship between structural parameters and the implied impulse response functions is non-
linear; we therefore obtain theoretical impulse response functions by applying standard numerical
techniques. Note that our procedure only admits saddle path stable solution and thus rules out by
construction any parameterization of the model which would give rise to equilibrium indeterminacy.
Standard errors for   θ are computed using the following expression for the asymptotic variance of our
estimator, taken from Wooldridge (2002):
[ Avar
 
  θ
 
=
 
G′WG
 −1  
G′W   ΣWG
  
G′WG
 −1 . (27)
14where G = ∇θIR represents the Jacobianof the impulse responsefunction generated from the model
and   Σ denotes the variance matrix of the impulse responses obtained from bootstrap sampling.
3.3 Parametric setup
In practice, given the number of the structural parameters, it is not possible to identify all of them
simultaneously. We therefore ﬁx those parameters prior to the estimation which are either given by
ﬁrst moments of the data or are fairly uncontroversial.
First we set ω = 0.88 which implies an import-to-GDP ratio of 12 percent, the average value for
the U.S. in our sample period. Moreover, we set, as, for instance, in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1994) β = 0.99, γ = 2 and   = 0.34 as well as θ = 0.36 and δ = 0.025. In addition, we assume
that government spending accounts for 20 percent of GDP, close to the average in our sample period.
Regarding price rigidities, we set ξ = 0.75, which implies an average duration of prices of one year
which is broadly in line with the evidence discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). We set υ
such that the markup earned by intermediate goods ﬁrms in steady state is 20 percent.
We are thus left with nine parameters for which we seek to obtain estimates by solving (26). We
estimate a value for the trade price elasticity, ˜ σ, by adjusting σ according to the relationship (5). In
addition, we pin down values for the parameters measuring investment adjustment costs, χ, price
indexation, κ, habits, b, as well as for those parameters which specify the interest rate feedback rule:
φπ,φy and ρ. Two additional parameters, which are of particular importance for the international
monetary transmission mechanismare α, measuring the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms and η which is directly
related to the degree of strategic price-setting complementarities.
3.4 Results
Table1 providesthe estimationresults. We ﬁndplausiblepointestimatesandfairly narrowconﬁdence
bounds implied by the standard errors reported in parentheses. The estimated trade price elasticity
is below the values often used or found in the literature. Yet several recent studies suggest that a
low trade price elasticity may help to account for a larger set of macroeconometric observations,
see Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), Kollmann (2006) and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2005).
Also χ, the parameter capturing investment adjustment costs is somewhat below the value reported in
Christiano et al. (2005). This is likely to be the result of the aggregation function of ﬁnal goods, see
the discussion in Backus et al. (1994).
In line with earlier research we also ﬁnd full indexation of prices, see, for instance, Meier and Müller
(2006). Regarding monetary policy we ﬁnd parameter values which imply a fairly loose monetary
stance. Note, however, that our solution procedure rules out equilibrium indeterminacy. The degree
of interest rate smoothing is in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature, see, for instance, Clarida
15Table 1: Estimated parameter values of DSGE model
Parameter Description
˜ σ Trade price elasticity 0.48
(0.63)
χ Investment adjustment costs 0.99
(0.62)
κ Price indexation 1.00
(−)
φπ Inﬂation coefﬁcient in policy rule 1.00
(0.51)
φy Output coefﬁcient in policy rule 0.01
(0.13)
ρ Interest rate smoothing 0.67
(0.09)
b Habits 0.90
(0.05)
α Share of ﬁrms with local currency pricing 0.88
(0.15)
η NCES-parameter −11.00
(15.67)
Notes: Parameter estimates obtained from matching DSGE and VAR impulse response func-
tions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. Those parameter values which have been
estimated to be at their theoretical bounds have been assumed to take this value prior to estima-
tion; in this case no standard error is reported.
et al. (2000) for the U.S. We ﬁnd a considerable amount of habits in consumption, somewhat above
the values reported in Smets and Wouters (2005) both for the euro area and the U.S.
For the share of ﬁrms engagedin LCP we ﬁnd a value somewherebetween 80 and 99 percentreported
by Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Bergin (2006), respectively for the U.S. Finally, the estimate for
the parameter η provides a measure for the curvature of our demand functions. Our estimate is
somewhat higher than the values assumed by Gust et al. (2006) and Guerrieri et al. (2008), but close
to the value assumed by Smets and Wouters (2007) in a closed economy context.
In order to assess the implication of our estimate for η, we display in ﬁgure 2 the percentage change
in demand for a generic good (vertical axis) resulting from a percentage change in its relative price
(horizontal axis). The dashed line shows the implied demand function for our estimate of η, while
the solid line displays the results for η = 0 implying a constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
Relative to the CES case, our estimate implies strongly curved demand functions. As a result, if
the relative price increases, demand falls more than proportionally, while, if the relative price falls,
demand increases less than proportionally. This induces strategic complementarities in price-setting,
which, ceteris paribus, provides ﬁrms with an incentive to adjust prices so as to avoid large deviations
from the domestic currency price charged by domestic and foreign competitors.
Given the estimated parameter values, we compute the impulse responses of the model and compare
them to those obtained from the VAR model. The dashed-dotted lines in the panels of ﬁgure 1 show
that the model responses track the empirical responses quite closely. All the responses are within
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Figure 2: Demand function for intermediate goods. Notes: Solid line: CES case (η = 0); dashed-dotted line:
NCES case (η = −11.1); vertical axes: relative demand in percent; horizontal axes: relative price in percent.
the conﬁdence bounds of the VAR responses, except for the impact response of CPI-inﬂation and net
exports. Also the theoretical response of investment is somewhat less pronounced than its empirical
counterpart. The response of the consumption differential, as well as those of domestic inﬂation
and the interest rate are matched particularly closely. Overall, we conclude that the DSGE model—
if evaluated at the point estimates—provides a quantitatively satisfactory account of the monetary
transmission mechanism as apparent for the estimated VAR model.
4 The role of openness in monetary policy transmission
In this section we take up the question which motivates our investigation: does trade integration play
a quantitatively important role for the transmission of monetary policy? Given that the estimated
DSGE model provides a structural and quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission
mechanism, it is well suited for counterfactual experiments which allow us to quantify the role of
openness. We will also brieﬂy explore some implications for monetary policy.
4.1 The role of openness
Severalquantitativestudieshavedemonstratedthat it is possibleto accountfor the actualtransmission
mechanism while abstracting from foreign trade altogether, see Christiano et al. (2005). At the same
time, economies are bound to become more open as a result of increasing trade integration. While
the average import share for the U.S. over the period 1973–2006 has been about 12 percent, it has
been increasing secularly: from about 6 percent at the beginning of the sample to about 16 percent at
the end of the sample. Interestingly, the trend seems to have been accelerating over the last 10 years
or so. Against this background, we compare monetary transmission in the estimated model where
imports account for 12 percent to two counterfactual scenarios: an approximately closed economy
with imports accounting for less than 0.01 percent and a very open economy with imports accounting
17for 40 percent of ﬁnal goods.
Figure 3 displaysimpulse responsesof domestic inﬂation (upperrow) and domestic absorption(lower
row) to a domestic monetary policy shock, i.e. an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate by
100 basis points. The responses in the left column are computed using the estimated DSGE model
where all parameters, except for ω, are kept at their (estimated) baseline values, notably α measuring
the fraction LCP-ﬁrms. The dashed lines show the responses for the baseline case where imports
account for 12 percent of GDP, while solid lines show the responses for the ‘closed’ economy; the
dashed-dotted line shows the responses for the high-openness scenario. Recall that we focus on
domesticinﬂation andabsorption,becausethesevariablesare well deﬁnedin closed-economymodels
as well.14 A comparison of the responses reveals that opennessmatters very little for the transmission
of monetary policy shocks in the estimated model (left column).
In a ﬁrst step to interpret this results, recall that Clarida et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005)
have shown that there exists an isomorphic representation of the baseline New Keynesian model for
closed and open economies. Speciﬁcally, the dynamic ‘IS-curve’ and the New Keynesian Phillips
curve have the same structure. Relaxing the closed economy assumption induces only changes in
the parameters governing the pass-through of marginal costs onto domestic inﬂation and the interest
elasticity of demand, i.e. it alters only ‘slope’ coefﬁcients.15 More speciﬁcally, Erceg et al. (2007)
show that the difference between closed and open economies in this class of models can be attributed
to the effects of a single composite parameter: the weighted average of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the trade price elasticity. As openness determines the relative weights, an increase
in openness will alter the dynamic behavior of the economy strongly only if the trade price elasticity
differs considerably from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
This result is useful in interpreting our ﬁnding. Abstracting from habit formation, our choice of
parameter values for   and γ implies a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption ofabout3/4 which is in the middle ofthe rangeof the valuesdiscussedin the literature. Our
estimate for the trade price elasticity suggests a value which is only slightly lower. It thus appears
that because the trade price elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are of similar
magnitude, openness plays a very limited role in the monetary transmission mechanism.16
However, we have so far drawn on a discussion of the New Keynesianbaseline model where strategic
price-setting complementarities are absent, while we stressed a new dimension of the exchange rate
channelemerging undersuchcomplementarities, seesection 2.6. Speciﬁcally,in this caseopennessis
14The behavior of CPI inﬂation and output displays dynamics similar to domestic inﬂation and absorption, respectively.
An exception is the impact period where changes in the nominal exchange rate and net exports dominate the behavior of
domestic variables, because the latter are predetermined.
15Actually, for certain parameterizations even the difference in the slope coefﬁcients disappears such that ‘openness’ is
merely a source of additional shocks.
16In fact, when we increase the trade price elasticity, we ﬁnd openness to impact more strongly on monetary transmission.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to monetary policy shock Notes: Shock is exogenous increase in domestic nominal
interest rate by 100 basis points; lines show response of domestic variables. Solid line displays responses for zero import
share; dashed line: 12 percent import share; dashed-dotted line: 40 percent; all parameter values are kept at the values used
or obtained in the estimation of the model.
19likely to alter monetary transmission mechanism as it provides monetary policy with direct leverage
on domestic inﬂation. Yet this effect is not evident in the response of domestic inﬂation displayed in
ﬁgure 3—despite our estimate for η which suggests strong complementarities.
Yet openness and complementarities are not sufﬁcient for this effect to be present. As stressed above,
a third condition is a fair amount of exchange rate pass-through. To see this, consider a monetary
contraction: only if the resulting appreciation is reﬂected in foreign competitors charging lower do-
mestic currency prices, will domestic ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to lower their prices as well. In this case,
there will be downward pressure on domestic inﬂation due to strategic complementarities, in addition
to downward pressure resulting from muted demand and marginal costs.
In principle, this dimension of the exchange rate channel can be quite powerful from a quantitative
point of view. This is illustrated in the upper right panel of ﬁgure 3, which displays the impulse
responses of domestic inﬂation for the different degrees of openness, assuming a higher degree of
exchange rate pass-through: we lower the value of α from our estimate of 0.88 to 0.6. In this case,
increasing openness induces a much quicker and stronger fall in domestic inﬂation. In the open
economy (40 percent imports, dashed-dotted line) the response peaks after 3 quarters rather than
after 5 quarters in the closed economy. Moreover, the strength of the response increases by some 25
percent.17
The lower panels of ﬁgure 3 display the response of domestic absorption for all three openness sce-
narios, both for α = 0.88 (left panel) and α = 0.6 (right panel). Generally, domestic absorption
falls less in response to the monetary policy shock in the more open economy. The effect of open-
ness, however, is considerably more pronounced if the fraction of LCP-ﬁrms is lower, i.e. if exchange
rate pass-through is higher. To understand this result, recall that while a monetary policy shock
is an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate, what matters for the dynamic adjustment of
domestic absorption is the ex ante real interest rate. Its response depends on the dynamics of CPI-
inﬂation which, in turn, will vary with the degree of openness. On impact, CPI-inﬂation falls more
strongly than domestic inﬂation, because of the exchange rate appreciation. Yet as the exchange rate
overshoots, subsequent changes in the exchange rate tend to raise CPI-inﬂation relative to domestic
inﬂation—thereby dampening the rise in the real rate. Hence, the fall in domestic absorption is less
pronounced in more open economies. Again, this effect is stronger, the more pervasive exchange rate
pass-through.
17Interestingly, Ercegetal. (2007) alsodiscuss resultsfor theNCEScase. However, they stillﬁndthat theroleof openness
(for the transmission of technology shocks) is limited which is likely to be the result of assuming that all ﬁrms engage in
LCP.
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Figure 4: Openness and pass-through for the U.S. Notes: Left panel displays import-GDP ratio; right panel
displays reduced form estimate of exchange rate pass-through for 10 year rolling window recursive estimates, shaded area
displays two-standard error conﬁdence bounds.
4.2 Implications for monetary policy
Assuming strategic complementarities in price setting, monetary policy gains better control over do-
mestic inﬂation as trade integration increases, at least in principle. A necessary condition is that
import prices are not completely isolated from exchange rate movements. Yet our estimates sug-
gest that exchange rate pass-through is fairly limited. Moreover, several recent studies suggest that
exchange rate pass-through has been declining over the last one or two decades. Figure 4 provides
suggestive evidence for recent trends both in trade integration and exchange rate pass-through in the
U.S. The left panel displays the import-to-GDP ratio over the period 1973–2006. The right panel
displays a reduced-form recursive estimate of exchange rate pass-through for the same period.18 Our
results, suggesting a decline in pass-through over the last 10-15 years, are broadly in line with those
obtained in the literature, see, for instance, Marazzi et al. (2005) and Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg
(2006).
Hence, it appears that although openness is on the rise, pass-through will continue to decline, if
current trends prevail. This observationhasimportant implications for monetary policy. To assessthis
more formally, we compute, as a measure for the trade-off faced by monetary policy, the cumulative
reduction in domestic absorption relative to the cumulative reduction in domestic inﬂation for the
ﬁrst year after a monetary policy shock.19 Again we consider counterfactual scenarios and compare
18As it is not possible to obtain rolling window estimates based on the structural estimation approach employed above,
we resort to reduced form estimates. Speciﬁcally, similar to Gust et al. (2006) we regress recursively, using a 10 year rolling
window, the log-differenced relative import price (measured as the nominal price of non-commodity imports of goods and
services divided by the CPI-Index) on the log-differenced real effective exchange rate and a constant.
19To be precise about the trade-off faced by monetary policy, it would be necessary to specify an objective for monetary
policy. Assuming that monetary policy aims at stabilizing both domestic inﬂation and the output gap, one may argue that
there is no real trade-off in the present model: if both monetary authorities stabilize domestic inﬂation perfectly, they are
likely to stabilize the output gaps as well. However, this is only true in the absence of cost-push shocks, which are typically
found to be an important source of business cycle ﬂuctuations, see Smets and Wouters (2007). While our model is agnostic
21Table 2: Monetary policy trade-off
1 − ω α
0.00 0.88 4.8
0.12 0.88 4.5
0.40 0.88 3.9
0.40 0.60 2.6
Notes: Right column measures cumulative reduction in do-
mestic absorption relative to domestic inﬂation for the ﬁrst
year after monetary policy shock.
it to our baseline case: an economy which is approximately closed and an economy where imports
account for 40 percent. First, we keep pass-through low (at the value implied by our estimate of
α = 0.88), but allow, in a last experiment, for higher pass-through by lowering α to 0.6.
Table 2 reports the results, which conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. As a result of strategic price-setting
complementarities, monetary policy has direct leverage on domestic inﬂation, which operates irre-
spectively of a contraction in demand. The more open the economy, the stronger this effect appears.
At the same time, domestic absorption falls by less, because the monetary contraction implies a
smaller increase in the real interest rate. Both effects tend to improve our trade-off measure. Yet
from a quantitative point of view, this improvement is contained if pass-through is limited—as be-
comes apparent from the results of the fourth experiment (last row) where pass-through is increased
to counterfactually high levels.
It thus appears that, as long as exchange rate pass-through remains limited, increasing trade open-
ness has little bearing on the monetary transmission mechanism and the trade-off faced by monetary
policy.20 As a matter of fact, current trends suggest that while trade integration is increasing, pass-
through is decreasing. Yet it is conceivable that both phenomena are intertwined at a fundamental
level. While the present framework has allowed us to study isolated the effects of features, it seems
worthwhile to explore the possibility of a joint cause for both trends in future research.21
about the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations, our measure for the monetary policy trade-off might provide some idea of
how much reduction in domestic demand is necessary in order to engineer a certain reduction in domestic inﬂation. Our
measure is thus related to the sacriﬁce ratio, except that we do not consider a permanent reduction in inﬂation.
20Erceg et al. (2007) simulate the reduction of the inﬂation target incorporated in an interest rate feedback rule using the
SIGMA model of the FED. They compute the sacriﬁce ratio for different degrees of openness ﬁnding no important role for
the latter. Note, however, that while they assume strategic complementarities in price-stetting, they also assume LCP such
that import prices are isolated from exchange rate changes in the short-run.
21Dornbusch (1987) argues that the extent of exchange rate pass-through and goods market integration are jointly de-
termined. Gust et al. (2006) also link trade integration and exchange rate pass-through in a framework with strategic
complementarities. However, they abstract from nominal rigidities.
225 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the role of trade integration for monetary policy transmission. First, we de-
velop a New Keynesian DSGE model featuring two symmetric countries and several frictions which
recent business cycle research has found to be important in accounting for several macroeconometric
observations. In addition, following Gust et al. (2006), Sbordone (2007) and Guerrieri et al. (2008),
we assume a fairly general aggregation technology for ﬁnal goods. It induces strategic complemen-
tarities in price-setting with respect to domestic and foreign competitors such that domestic ﬁrms will
ﬁnd it optimal to adjust their prices in response to exchange rate changes which alter the domestic
currency price of imports—a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy
gains direct leverage over domestic inﬂation.
In order to quantify the effects of openness on monetary transmission, we estimate, in a ﬁrst step, a
VAR on U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries. We identify monetary
policy shocks by imposing an identiﬁcation scheme which is consistent with our theoretical model
and trace out the transmission mechanism through impulse response functions. In a second step, we
ﬁnd parameter values of the DSGE model by matching its impulse responses to those obtained from
the VAR.We ﬁnd that the estimated modelis generally ableto mimic the empirical responsefunctions
quite closely. Importantly, for the model to do so, we require a low value for the trade price elasticity
and the exchange rate pass-through, but strong complementarities in price-setting.
In a third step, we compare the effects of a monetary policy shock in the estimated model where
imports account for 12 percent of ﬁnal goods to two alternative scenarios: an economy which is ap-
proximately closed and one in which imports account for 40 percent. We ﬁnd the effects on domestic
inﬂation and absorption to be almost identical. Closer inspection reveals two reasons underlying this
ﬁnding. First, the estimated value of the trade price elasticity is close to the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. In this case, openness has been shown to induce little change in the New Keynesian
baseline model, see Erceg et al. (2007). Second, as regards the new dimension of the exchange rate
channel, we ﬁnd that limited exchange rate pass-through prevents it from having strong quantitative
effects. If we repeat our experiment while assuming higher exchangerate pass-through, the effects of
monetary policy shocks become considerably stronger.
Finally, turning to the implications for monetary policy, we stress that while increasing openness
could, in principle, improve the trade-off faced by monetary policy, such a development is likely to
be preventedby low exchangerate pass-through. At current trends, it appearsthat while trade integra-
tion, or openness,is on the rise, exchange rate pass-through is declining as far as major industrialized
countries are concerned. We conclude that while policy makers should keep a close eye on the joint
development of openness and exchange rate pass-through, future research may investigate possible
causes underlying these trends.
23A The New Keynesian Phillips curve
In the following, we go through the main steps of deriving the New KeynesianPhillips curve equation
(24). We split the derivation into 3 parts. In part one we solve the pricing problem of a generic
intermediate good LCP-ﬁrm in the domestic market (eq. 18). Part 2 solves the pricing problem of a
generic intermediate good PCP-ﬁrm in the domestic market (eq. 17). In part 3 we bring the ﬁrst parts
together using the ﬁrst order approximation of the deﬁnition of the producer price index.
A.1 Pricing problem of LCP-ﬁrm
Deﬁning It+k =
 k
s=1(ΠA
t+s−1)κ and maximizing equation (18) subject to the demand function (7),
we derive the following ﬁrst order condition
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where the elasticity of demand for good j in the domestic market is
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1
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Rewriting equation (28) using the deﬁnition of real marginal cost MCR
t = MCt
P A
t , deﬁning the contract
price as P
AQ,LCP
t (j) =
P
A,LCP
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P A
t and linearizing gives
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In the above equation all variables are expressed in log-deviations from steady-state. Log-linearizing
the elasticity of demand for good j equation (29), with Γ
Q
t = Γt
P A
t , we get
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Substituting this expression for the demand elasticity in the ﬁrst order condition, we have
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24Using the deﬁnition of the steady state markup   = ǫ
ǫ−1 and the deﬁnition of Ψ =
−η 
1−η , this
expression after quasi-differencing can be written as
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The log-linearized version of the competitive price index equation (13) in the domestic country im-
plies that
  Γ
Q
t = (1 − ω)  qt, (31)
where qt =
P B
t
P A
t is the relative import price in domestic currency. Using this to substitute for the
relative competitive price index above we get
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A.2 Pricing problem of PCP-ﬁrm
We can derive a similar expression for the PCP-ﬁrms. Maximizing equation (17) subject to the
demand function (9), we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
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where the elasticity of demand for good j in the domestic market is similar to the LCP-ﬁrms problem
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and the elasticity of demand for good j in the foreign market is given by
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Linearizing the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrms problem using P
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t (j) =
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25Linearizing both demand elasticities deﬁning Γ
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Substituting the demand elasticities into the ﬁrst order condition and simplifying yields
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After quasi-differencing, the expression can be rewritten as
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One can linearize the competitive price index in the foreign country analogously to the one in the
home country deﬁning the relative export price in foreign currency as qB∗
t =
P A∗
t
P B∗
t :
  Γ
Q∗
t = −ω  qB∗
t (34)
Using this expression and equation (31) to substitute for the relative competitive price indices above
we get
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A.3 New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The log-linearized version of the producer price index, equation (10), reads as
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. (35)
Using the ﬁnal equations in the two subsections above to substitute for the contract prices of LCP-
and PCP-ﬁrms one ﬁnally obtains a general formulation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
Et−1
 
  ΠA
t − κ  ΠA
t−1
 
= βEt−1
 
  ΠA
t+1 − κ  ΠA
t
 
+λEt−1
 
(1 − Ψ)   MC
R
t + Ψ
 
(1 − ω)(α + (1 − α)ω)
˜ σ
ǫ
  qB
t − (1 − ω)ω(1 − α)
˜ σ
ǫ
  qB∗
t + (1 − ω)(1 − α)  qA∗
t
  
26with λ = (1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)ξ−1.
The special cases with α = 0 and η = 0 are discussed in section 2.6. Here we brieﬂy discuss the case
of incomplete pass-through (0 < α < 1) and strategic complementarities in price setting (η < 0). In
addition to the closed economy Phillips curve or the open economy Phillips curve without strategic
complementarities three additional terms show up:   qB
t ,   qB∗
t and   qA∗
t . We discuss the underlying
economics in turn focusing on a monetary contraction which appreciates the nominal exchange rate.
A reduction of the relative import price   qB
t , induces domestic LCP ﬁrms to reduce their prices as their
demand elasticity increases with a decrease of the import price index relative to the domestic price
index. Domestic PCP-ﬁrms react in a similar way; in addition they adjust their price to changes in the
relative export prices.
Following a nominal appreciation, the relative export price of PCP-ﬁrms expressed in foreign cur-
rency,   qB∗
t , increases. Recall that PCP-ﬁrms can adjust export prices only through adjustments in
domestic prices which are then translated via the law of one price into foreign currency. Hence, the
increase in the export price, puts downward pressure on (domestic currency) price of PCP-ﬁrms.
Following a nominal appreciation, the export prices PCP-ﬁrms increase relative to the export prices
of LCP-ﬁrms—in foreign currency terms. This is captured by a decrease in   qA∗
t . As the PCP-ﬁrms
can adjust their export price only by adjusting their domestic price, this puts additional downward
pressure on domestic prices of PCP-ﬁrms.
All these effects become stronger with the degree of strategic price-setting complementarities η and
the import share 1−ω. As stressed in the main text, the effects also depend on the degree of exchange
rate pass-through. Note that if there are only LCP-ﬁrms (α = 1), the last two terms in the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve drop out and only real marginal cost and the relative import price govern
the domestic inﬂation dynamics. Yet, in this case import prices do not directly respond to exchange
rate changes.
27B Data
Our data are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook database, see OECD (2007). The ROW
aggregate comprises data for Canada, the U.K., Japan and the Euro area. We use data for private
consumption (volume), private ﬁxed investment (excl. stockbuilding, volume), and the deﬂator for
private consumption and the deﬂator for GDP. The latter series are used to construct the CPI-inﬂation
and domestic inﬂation, respectively.
To construct a measure for net exports of the U.S., we deﬂate exports (exports of goods and services,
value, local currency) and imports (imports of goods and services, value, local currency) with their
deﬂators (export or import price goods and services, local currency) and compute the log-difference
of both series. Measuresfor the short term interest rates are also obtained from the Economic Outlook
database (interest rate, short-term) except for the Euro area. In this case we draw on data (STN) from
the Area-Wide Model database of the ECB, see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001).
To compute the ROW series, we calculate quarterly growth rates and aggregate these series on the
basis of GDP weights (PPP-adjusted, year 2000), based on data from the IMF (2007). To obtain
levels, we cumulate aggregated growth rates.
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